Operational Intelligence and the creation of OSIS:

VADM David C. Richardson and the Operator's perspective on the creation of the Ocean Surveillance Information System
 

VADM David C. Richardson, 1966
 
Gentle Readers,

OK, I am lazy this morning. I have things to do. I got up late, and instead of being juiced with the thrill of the weekend, I got lost in a note from a grand old admiral, one of the dwindling number of veterans of World War II, but also one of the architects of the Cold War maritime strategy.
 
VADM David C. Richardson, USN-Ret. is a naval aviator and graduate of the Naval Academy’s class of 1936. His operational credentials are superb. He is the former Commander of the Sixth Fleet (the US Navy in the Med) and former Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Other noteworthy operational assignments included command of Carrier Division Seven (1966), Carrier Division Five and CTF-77 (1966-67), and the Sixth Fleet (1968-70). Richardson served as a pilot and commander of several fighter squadrons, as well as the USS Cimarron (AO-22) and USS Hornet. (CV-12)
 

USS Cimarron replenishes USS Hornet along with USS Nicholas- two of VADM Richardson’s afloat commands together in 1966
 
He earned many decorations, including three Distinguished Service Medals and the Distinguished Flying Cross. Following his retirement in 1972, Admiral Richardson has frequently consulted with numerous Defense Department advisory panels and military contractors, drawing upon his extensive experience in the field of intelligence.
 
It is in this last category that VADM Richardson’s impact on the art of operational intelligence is most significant. Now in his 90’s, and one of the few surviving veterans of the disastrous Battle of Savo Island, he remains a believer in the criticality of intelligence. He those hard-learned lessons as a Fleet Commander at the height of the Cold War, and when the Soviet Navy challenged the west for dominance of the World Ocean. Long-time professional CAPT Bob Tolle, USN-Ret, comments on this remarkable account: “…it highlights how important the relationship is between exploiter and provider, as well as the results of innovation and hard work, and not just maintaining the status quo.”
 
Bob Toll served with Admiral Richardson SIXTH Fleet nearly forty years ago- when the Russian Bear was taking to sea in a major way, and the operational commander needed time-critical information on a nuclear threat that was only minutes away- Vic.
 
 
Dear Vic,
 
This letter is intended to substantiate the belief that combat operational effectiveness improvements these past 40 years the result of an intimacy that evolved between the exploiter of intelligence and the provider. We learned during WWII that aggressive commanders win battles. The difference between a wise commander and one who is foolhardy is the use made by that commander of operationally significant intelligence information. The central lesson we must remember when changes are planned in our naval intelligence support structure is the essentiality of preserving at combat control levels the intimate relationship that has evolved during these past 40 years between the exploiter of intelligence and its provider.
 
I also intend to address other very important lessons learned that are also rooted in our Vietnam experience that are critically important to the future of Naval Intelligence. These we learned in the course of conducting air strike operations from our carrier task forces in the Gulf of Tonkin that later led to the creation of the Ocean Surveillance Information System.
 
A major institutional failure for many years (but not today?) was the failure to instill appreciation for the essentiality of intelligence exploitation in the minds of line officers as they train for applying military force. To anyone who questions that I simply point out that it was not until 1971 that our Naval War College got a tempest-approved (SCIF) facility.
 
For that installation we can thank Naval Intelligence Officer Captain R. J. Tolle, and the then President of the Naval War College. When orders came for Bob Tolle to attend the Naval War College, I "ordered" him to seek an appointment with the president to brief him on 6th Fleet and suggest he send over some of his staff. That Bob did, then upon the day he was scheduled to brief the president, the outer office gave him 15 minutes, but asked that he finish sooner as the president had a very busy schedule. Bob exited over an hour later, with orders to establish a tempest facility there as his primary duty.
 
There are many unclassified sources of the basic principles that impart comprehension of good intelligence exploitation. Books such as Very Special Intelligence, by Sir Patrick Beasley, Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox, Civil War's Nathan Bedford Forrest, authors Kahn and Winterbotham and many others illuminate the principles involved.
 
I am myself an example of that failure to educate.
 
My assignment to ComCarDiv SEVEN with further orders to ComCarDiv FIVE and overall commander of our carrier task forces in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War (4/'66 to 5/67) was made by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral MacDonald.
 
He instructed me "to take care of the lads," an admonition I came to understand only after arrival in theater and learning of the operational constraints imposed on us. My staff was already "theater-wise", as it was on its second deployment. Upon arrival in theater my Operations Officer, Captain Robert (Bob) Hunt told me, "If we concentrate on flight deck operations, we can maybe improve things five percent. If we can choose targets better, we can double or triple our effectiveness." He also said that we should find out where the enemy was weakest and hit him there.  
 
Hunt's simple observations made perfect sense to me, so I "married" him to my Intelligence Officer, with instructions to choose the targets to be attacked.
 
Bob's assistant took over his operations job. I very much regret I cannot now recall the name of my then-intelligence officer, a failure I attribute to my advanced age, now 94.
 
The two of them mounted large maps in their own space and, exploiting our photographic capabilities, created systems of functionally related targets in their quest to identify those targets within a system that most adversely affected that system's functioning. They found many instances where a few well placed bombs away from population centers where large bridges were located and where AAA defense was lower that were far more disruptive of NVN re-supply efforts. For one example, photos of strings of boats, hidden upstream during daylight, showed us how the NVN worked around non-functioning large rail bridges.

Our freedom to operate was limited to interdiction targets south of Hai Phong and Hanoi to about 30 miles inland. Our choice of targets was limited to rail, road and barge targets the NVN used to re-supply their Vietcong forces in the south. The NVN response to our new approach was to dig caves into hillsides.
 
They then offloaded from breaks in one system into the caves, which materials were later loaded into transport in another transport system for a further advance southward until the next break. Thus over the course of the year they created a 60 mile "ware-house." The effort, however, was much slower and more costly for them, especially in manpower. For us the main problem was foul weather that severely limited the frequency of our re-strikes and our ability to be fully effective.
 

FICPACFAC Subic Bay Patch
 
We converted FICPACFAC in Subic from a photo distribution center to an analytical center for assisting in choosing targets. This action, of course, brought ComSEVENTHFlt and his IO together with CINCPACFLT's Operations Officer down to find out what was going on. They highly approved Bob's explanation of our new approach.  They also liked the action we had taken to provide a radio intelligence specialist in flag plot. From him we learned things about NVN control of their air defense activity which enabled us to exploit deceptive measures in support of air strikes and to increase our SAR effectiveness. We learned to launch the very infrequent air strikes against the more dangerous ALFA targets that were inland near Hanoi only after first launching an air strike against much less hazardous coastal targets. Their air defense controllers stayed concentrated on our first launch.
 
As a result of our keeping photo records of our air strikes over the course of a year, in late '67 in a study prepared for the CNO, Admiral Moorer, we concluded that our air strikes forced changes in NVN's re-supply efforts that featured many more targets, but with each having less significance. The conclusion was that we were losing the interdiction war. We needed new policies. Although a start was made in the Joint Staff, the effort did not last long. It did not fit the concepts in the minds of the MacNamara crowd. Weknew that a platoon of Marines, judiciously landed from time to time, could accomplish far more lasting damage to NVN supply lines, including destruction of those caves in hillsides.
 
Several visits during those times had considerable effect later. Retired Vice Admiral Bill Schoech, who was our first Chief of Naval Material, was very intelligence oriented. He and CDR J.W “Whispering Willie” Holcomb, a Naval Aviator who was long known in inner circles of the intelligence community, were among those briefed by Bob Hunt. They came back to Washington to apply their considerable influence on things that later happened, one being my assignment a year later, in August, '68, to command SIXTH Fleet

DNI Harlifinger
 
When advised of my orders to command SIXTH Fleet, I asked the DNI, Rear Admiral Fritz Harlfinger, to brief me on what was going on in the Fleet area of responsibility. He said he didn't have that information. He suggested I see Rear Admiral Ralph Cooke out at NSG, go to Langley then return to him for what he could provide. Only the day with Cooke proved to be useful. Admiral Schoech invited me to lunch, one that lasted five hours. Present also were Holcomb and Cunningham who had headed Air America in SE Asia. I mentioned my fruitless visit with Harlfinger. I later learned that Schoech sent Holcomb to recite that tale to the CNO, Admiral Moorer.

ADM Moorer
Moorer sent for Harlfinger and instructed him to designate someone who was fully advised regarding SIXTH fleet activity who would keep him, the CNO, updated. That individual was Captain, later, Rear Admiral Bill Moffet.
 
I relieved as COMSIXTHFLT August 15th, 1968. My carrier force commander invited me to preside at his change of command 2 weeks later. I suggested that C I NCUSNAVEUR, Admiral Wendt, join us, after which we would together assess the adequacy of my intelligence support. We learned that apart from the IOIC and our RA-5 photo aircraft (which of course could not fly over areas where our assigned targets were) our only useful intelligence was in Baedecker travel books.

VADM and Mrs. Richardson being invested as Citizens of the Island of Rhodes
 
We then initiated a message from SIXTHFLT requesting overhead (space) photography, stating that it was required if we were expected to be effective in the first 24 hours of a conflict. Given several days, we could solve our problem by ourselves. In December we were authorized to use space photography at two levels of security. Similar support was then also provided to CINCPACFLT.
 
Back in those days the normal process was to brief operationally significant Special Intelligence each day to only a very small number of cleared staff members. We, instead, combined Special Intelligence with other information to brief a larger number of my staff at the all-source level, most especially to include all staff duty officers who I had ordered to initiate action in response to events in a timely fashion when my Operations Officer, Chief of Staff and I were absent.
 
I had learned from making a study at the Naval War College that the loss of Astoria, Quincy and Vincinnesin the battle of Savo Island the night of August 8th, '42 resulted partially from the failure of their commanding officers to delegate authority.  I was nearby aboard SARATOGA (CV-3) in VF-5 when that battle occurred.
 
I also required of our briefers that new information be presented in the context of what we knew before. New developments were to be briefed as occurring. Once again, I was very fortunate in the officers I inherited from my predecessor.

 
This one was Captain Emery Sourbeer, my IO, who was ably assisted by two others, Lt. Bob Tolle. and Lt. Mike Rodgers. I was informed NATO's radar network could not be relied upon. Someone advised that the British radar on CYPRESS covered the Eastern Mediterranean. We invited the commanding officer there, a British Group Captain, to spend several days with us to become acquainted with our efforts to create a full time surveillance network within the Mediterranean. With inputs from Italy in one information category we, with the British, put into being the Mediterranean Surveillance Net at the Special lntelligence security level,          
 
In December, '68, the CNO sent a delegation led by Bill Moffet to see me Included were Holcomb, CINCUSNAVEUR's IO, three representatives from the CIA, and as I recall, two from USCINCEUR. They gave me an encrypted communications system that would enable me to contact the CNO and CINCUSNAVEUR almost immediately, whenever required. A CIA representative advised he would "put a Mercedes on my mast- head."
 
My response, somewhat later, was for "ATSAMYBOAT," a pleasure craft manned with Italians of both sexes and equipped initially to collect Soviet underwater communications that were collectable when their ships were in anchorages. I also think it was about this time that we learned about Task Force 57, which was so useful in helping us keep track of Soviet submarines.

Soviet CVHG-109 Moskva in the Med
 
I've not mentioned VQ-2, which functioned generally to provide special assistance, often on request, as when it reported the advance of the new Soviet carrier, MOSKVA, toward the Dardanelles. That information permitted my staff duty officer, CDR (later Admiraj) “Ace” Lyons, to send the fleet photo unit from Naples to Athens to embark on a destroyer captained by an intelligence sub-specialist with orders to proceed to intercept MOSKVA upon entry into the Aegean Sea. He trailed MOSKVA throughout her time in the Mediterranean, receiving plaudits for his ship-handling from her skipper on one occasion when by heady maneuvering he defeated the efforts or several Egyptian destroyers to force him to give way.

VQ-2 Whales on Patrol from Naval Station Rota, Spain

About the beginning of my second year in command, the CNO, Admiral Moorer, came for a visit. In his entourage was the vice admiral who was Mr. Moneyman in OPNAV and DNI Harlfinger.
 
Harlfinger proposed establishing my intelligence support setup ashore at Rota, Spain, saying he would increase the personnel and they would be charged with advising all my ships about Soviet activity in the Med. He had in mind establishing a Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information System in Rota as part of the Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS).
 
I agreed, but insisted I keep my core Intelligence officers with me on the flagship. I wanted to rotate Rota personnel through my staff to assure they knew our plans to counter Soviet Navy swift, sudden attack policy, and to provide what we identified as needed. With CINCUSNAVEUR's support, this was agreed upon.
 
Another result of this visit was a follow-on visit by Mr. Howard Lorenzen, then technical director of Navy's fledgling space-based surface unit detection system. Upon being briefed into that system, I made application and we then started receiving that support.
 
Harlfinger also offered to place IOs in Italy and Greece to work with the ClA for such assistance as they could provide, and I gladly accepted. This gave me a rapid means of requesting assistance from the Italian Air Force as well as occasional heads-up information. 

Soviet SS-N-3 Shaddock test
 
In response to my query the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) at Suitland, proposed, and I supported, development of the equipment that when later combined operationally with what we learned from monitoring Soviet anti-carrier exercises enabled me to establish guidance that would avoid our carriers when at sea being hit by nuclear-tipped SSN-3 missiles in swift, sudden attack. One solution: keep a distance of not less than 300 nm!
 
With Rota as it's model, over the next two years the OSIS came into being. It's structure and functioning emphasized the essentiality of preserving the intimacy of exploiter and provider. The provider of intelligence must fully understand the plans and policies of the operator, plans which constantly change when in fluid situations, The exploiter needs timely information updates about an adversary to make those needed changes.

Commencing in 1975 with computer technology beginning to produce smaller computers the Commander CARDIV ONE, Rear Admiral (later Admiral) Kinnear asked NavElex to provide him computer capability for exercising command and control. The result was a development called OUTLAW HAWK. During the following 3 years development of HAWK'S successor, OUTLAW SHARK succeeded in better correlating intelligence with operations and improving the timeliness and coverage of all source information being provided to flagships at sea.
 
These two programs led to creation of Flag Tactical Command Centers. These improvements that were mainly in information presentation, and were accompanied by production of intelligence overviews that greatly improved both planning and execution of air strike warfare. For that product we can thank a combination of line officers and intelligence officers, working together at Suitland.
 
When combined with those being made in various space based systems and communications systems we are brought to where we are today.

Copyright 2008 Vic Socotra
www.vicsocotra.com