When it comes to lessons learned, everyone seems to focus on the battlefield tactics and the application of current technology. While that is very interesting, there are some other points we can already pull from this war…

First, nuclear weapons are the holy grail of strategic planning. I read an article the other day by one of the doyens of strategic thought that made the point that the war in Ukraine showed what little value resided in nuclear weapons, that Russia had all those nuclear weapons and couldn’t use them. Unfortunately, the author completely missed the point: Russia owes its existence, from this year forward, to nuclear weapons. If you don’t think so, ask yourself this question: how different would NATO and the West be fighting this war (through Ukraine) if Russia had no nuclear force?

The lesson there for the US is important: the more flexible and robust your nuclear force, the more difficult it is for any country or any alliance to push the US into a corner. Further, the harder the US infrastructure, and the more types of delivery systems that the US can defeat, the more effective that nuclear force.

There is a second point to that as well: unless you place full faith in the US promise to shield your country with our nuclear force, you need your own nuclear weapons. For the US, unless Washington wishes to prevent nuclear proliferation in the next 20 years, it will need to demonstrate an unblemished sincerity and focus on maintaining that nuclear umbrella.

Second, long wars are never good. What’s a long war? The old saw about the difference between low intensity conflict and high intensity conflict applies here (low intensity conflict is when the other guy is being shot at, high intensity conflict is when you are being shot at). When watching someone else fight a war, it might not seem so long; when it’s you, your people and your gear that are being used up, day after day, wars can very quickly start feeling long. And any war that requires more people than what you started with in your initial assault will start to feel long, and will, in fact, have all the extraordinary impact on your nation that you are probably hoping to avoid.

How many wars turn out to be long? Nearly all of them. Planners love 90 or 180 day planning windows, the lightning strike, the dashing campaign, then home for the holidays – whether it’s Napoleon’s march to Moscow or the US invasion of Iraq. I am sure there were guys in the Kremlin who 12 months ago, as they geared up for the attack, were talking about 30 day and 60 day phases and how it was going to be all wrapped up in time for the May Day parade. Sure.

Third, war industry counts. Particularly when it comes to ammunition and supplies and maintenance of front-line gear like trucks and tanks, and airplanes. And that is expensive. Wars don’t work with “just in time” logistics; wars mean stockpiles, and extra stockpiles, and lots more ammo and fuel and all that gear. And the ability to move that gear. As a friend of mine told me many years ago: you never have enough lift or enough ammo; never. Technology and tactics are interesting, but if you – or your enemy – get past that short war dream, and you (or your enemy) have (has) the industry, you (or they) can learn and build, and copy and train. But that requires a healthy economy and the factories and workers and raw material, etc. And standing the rest of your economy on its ear as you focus on the war.

Fourth, Allies count – a lot. As Churchill observed, the only thing worse than fighting a war with allies, is fighting one without allies. If there’s one overriding lesson from this war it’s this: have good allies. Preferably one with a GDP 15 times larger than your enemy’s.

Which leads to some thoughts on China (a nation with no real allies), in as much as there was a story in the papers that the Director of the CIA said that Emperor Xi told his Mandarins to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027.

For Beijing, the war needs to end in less than 90 days so that there is no real chance of large-scale deployments by any of those who would oppose you. If those who will support Taiwan (the US, Japan, Korea, India, Australia, NATO) can get large numbers of weapons and people there in less than 90 days, you need to finish the war before they can get there; your war plan needs to be “faster.” Good luck with that.

Remember, if the war doesn’t end quickly, much of the rest of the world – the US, NATO, Japan, Korea, Australia, and India – are going to line up against you and the war will bog down and you will bleed out. You may not think so, but, remember that you are importing 12 million barrels of oil per day. And a great deal of food.

Beijing needs a short war and a real termination plan. Even if you win on the ground, unless you can come up with a no-kidding, honest-to-God, war termination there will be a temptation to drag it out and again, bleed you.

And as part of that war termination, Beijing will need to figure out how to make everyone like you again.

If – when – Beijing invades Taiwan, the world will have to admit that the Emperor indeed has no clothes, that Emperor Xi is a violent dictator and the CCP is not substantially different than the Nazi party, except the CCP has killed far more people than the Nazis ever even dreamt of killing. China and the CCP will become the enemy of all the rest of mankind. With the possible exception of North Korea no one will want to have anything to do with them. Is that part of the plan?

You might be able to invade and conquer Taiwan. But afterwards, you won’t be trusted for at least 2 generations. Take a look at the sanctions regime built up against Russia and imagine that for 40 years or so.

Copyright 2023 Arrias
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