Since early 1953 (in Korea), the United States hasn’t lost a battalion sized force (or larger) in combat operations. In Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc., the US has outfought every enemy. Since

Desert Storm, including Somalia, the US hasn’t lost any engagement larger than a platoon.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom the US and its allies ground forces attacked into Iraq with a force perhaps 2/3rds that of Iraq’s army; the attacking force won decisively. In 8 years of combat operations that followed the US always

had the tactical advantage. Combat operations were often slow and painful, particularly at the squad and platoon level, because the US was determined to minimize innocent casualties. But larger units – battalion and brigade

sized units – were never threatened on the battlefield.

A host of reasons explain US tactical and operational success: excellent equipment, excellent battlefield intelligence and surveillance, superb logistics, excellent communications, superb small unit training, and superb (best in the

world) senior enlisted personnel.

Yet the wars still drag on, long after repeated successes on the battlefield, yielding desultory results, while costs in money, time and people, continue to climb.

Why?

During WWII the US didn’t have the best destroyers (Germany did), or the best subs (Germans), the best torpedoes (Japan), the best tanks (Germans and Russians), best cruisers (Japan or Germany), best infantry weapons

(Germans), best soldiers (until late in the war — Germans), best aircraft carriers (Brits at the start of the war, the US after the Essex class was commissioned), and so on.

But we won…

Throughout the 1920s, we weorked the Rainbow plans, adapting and adjusting plans to better use what we had rather than trying to solve everything with a better “widget.” We eventually developed plans that would work – and

we won the waith them. And despite those who suggest the US wasn’t innovative, the first plan to attack Pearl Harbor with carrier aircraft was developed by Admiral Yarnell in Fleet Problem XIII (1932), a tactic repeated by

Admiral King in Fleet Problem XIX (1939).

World War II combat operations were followed by extensive (one might say vast) plans, an overarching “grand strategy” integrating all elements of US (and allied) power into a comprehensive plan to rebuild Europe, and Japan

(and eventually Korea) into the first world, western nations they are today.

Because of these plans, US presence in Japan, Germany (and Italy, the UK, and a few other countries) continues to this day – 71 years later. The presence of those forces serves US interests – political, economic, social.

But today, while succeeding brilliantly on the battlefield, we quickly become “confused” outside of combat. The fault lies not in our combat forces themselves, the fault is in the failure to develop overarching, “grand strategies”

that begin with a crystal clear enunciation of our goals – what planners call the “end state” – followed by integrated departmental strategies across the entire government. Everyone is complicit; senior military planners have

grown sloppy in their strategic thinking (tactical planning is much more interesting and rewarding than strategic thought); and an entire generation of government and think-tank personnel who are intimately familiar with

governmental processes, but who pay lip-service to integrated plans, eschewing the painful and unpleasant effort associated with grand strategy.

Since the 1950s only presidents Eisenhower and Reagan have successfully cobbled together anything approaching a grand strategy. President-elect Trump can change that. But he must begin immediately; once the “daily grind”

starts he’ll find it virtually impossible to get “in front of the bus.”

So, Mr. Trump might consider spending a weekend framing how he wants the world to look in 10 years. To cynics who say Trump can’t do this, my answer is that anyone who’s ever built a building already thinks this way.

He just:

1) Needs to be “translated” into the language of strategic planning.

2) Direct your national security advisor to appoint a deputy for “grand strategy.” Provide him the results of your weekend effort; that person (and a small staff) will “translate” it into “commander’s guidance,” chopping it through

you until it’s in words you like.

3) Parse this to the respective offices throughout the government for development of individual elements of the grand strategy, then force them to integrate each element across the executive branch.

And keep Congress and the Citizenry fully involved.

You can repeat the strategic successes of the past.

Copyright 2016 Arrias

http://www.vicsocota.com