Syria, China and the Trump Administration

If you haven’t paid attention to the civil war in Syria (entering its 6th year in March), the Assad – Russia coalition has moved deep into the city of Aleppo, and now controls all but part of eastern Aleppo. This means that Assad and the Russians are winning the war. It may take another year or two, but short of some untoward event, Assad has survived. It’s now only a matter of time before he regains the rest of Syria.

4500 miles away, about 50 miles off the coast of the Philippines, another event took place last week that may have as great a significance to the United States (and President-Elect Trump): a Chinese Navy ship seized an instrumented drone being used by the USNS Bowditch, which was engaged in bottom surveys well outside not only Chinese claimed waters, but also China’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

Although seemingly unrelated, these two events offer Mr. Trump an opportunity to reset US policy.

First, it’s necessary to understand how the US finds itself in this situation. In 2011, in the wake of the “Arab Spring,” the Obama administration supported uprisings that were, in fact, backed by militant Islamic organizations in Egypt and in Syria. The US also chose to overthrow the unpleasant, but finally cooperative, Col. Qaddafi in Libya. The result of these choices was violence in Egypt (which led to a counter-revolution), the “conversion” of Libya into a failed state, and fueling of the civil war in Syria. Long-time regional US allies (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, Egypt, Jordan) began to wonder whether the US was a dependable ally. The “nuclear deal” with Iran further undermined their confidence in the U.S.

Into this ambiguity stepped Russia and Iran. Russia, using high-tech forces, Russian special operations personnel, and Iranian army units to support their client (President Assad of Syria), established a de facto “Damascus Pact,” stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, in East Asia, despite US promises of the “Asia Pivot,” China began to flex its “muscles,” with a substantial build-up of naval forces, intending to establish hegemony over first, the entire South China Sea, and more recently the East China Sea and all relevant island archipelagos. The US response has been at times tepid, and at times ambiguous; with the US Navy conducting operations in and through Chinese claimed waters, but doing little to support claims by friends and allies to islands now occupied by China.

The Chinese have capitalized on this confusion and have continued to expand their presence in and around these various islands and over the entire South China Sea. This increasingly muscular China, and an increasingly disinterested State Department, has led to once certain US allies and friends – the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, et al, consciously distancing themselves from Washington and seeking to cozy up to Beijing.

With this latest act of seizing the US bottom-survey sensor, the Chinese have changed, once again, the strategic equation in the South China Sea, making it clear that they will set the bench mark for what is and isn’t acceptable behavior.

Which leads to the obvious question: What should the Trump administration do once in office in less than 5 weeks?

First, the US needs to reaffirm that it will support US interests, not the interests of the amorphous global community, or in the interests of an effete elite in Brussels or the ivory towers of academe. This will come as a relief to many of our allies and friends, who understand that their interests and US interests are very much in common.

Second, the US needs to communicate in private to both Moscow and Beijing that there is a new administration in Washington and that what was acceptable before, is no longer acceptable. We will defend US interests. Have Secretary of Defense Mattis take the Russian and Chinese ambassadors – separately – for walks along the Potomac and explain that: “Mr. Trump is Not Mr. Obama, Mr. Tillerson is Not Mr. Kerry, and me, I’m Gen. Mattis.” They’ll understand the message.

This must be backed up by clear commitment of assets supporting friends and allies both in East Asia and the Middle East. Demonstration of intent now will prevent these situations from further deteriorating, a condition that would certainly involve serious – and costly – damage to US interests.

Third, the US needs to commit the necessary funding to increase the size and capability of US naval and air forces, allowing us to maintain the security of US and allied interests in the regions. Doing so will not only provide future administrations with the wherewithal to defend US interests, it will send the clearest possible signal of the seriousness of the Trump administration.