We nearly had a revolt of our own out on The Patio. Not that there were any Flag or General Officers involved. It was mmore of a vigorous debate about what was happening in our Navy today. you know, the one that commissions a whole class of ships and retires them nearly as fast as they appear alongside the pier. Or take a new carrier class nearly a decade before it is ready to engage on distant shores.

With rockets and sophisticated missiles in flight, we thought it might be useful to recall how we got here, And the mutiny that accompanied the journey.

We mentioned the outbreak of the struggle that resulted in the National Military Establishment of 1947. Since the acronym of those three words produced a phrase recalling an intimate medical procedure similar to that experienced by our current Secretary of a thing that became known a the Department of Defense, or “DoD.” The struggle had begun in the 1930s as Army Air Corps aircraft demonstrated the ability to successfully attack sea-going targets. The realization of the success of the strategic bombing campaign was part of the impetus for a complete reform of two organizations that had been cabinet posts since the beginning of the nation.

Some Senior officers in the War Department began to agitate vocally for an independent service to manage airborne operations before the invasion at Normandy. The later revelations of the debate that caused the “Revolt” showed it had been building for several years. It climaxed in 1949 when many of those officers, including Chief of Naval Operations Louis E. Denfeld as well as Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, were either fired or forced to resign. Critical to the process was a man named james V. Forrestal, who would become the First in Defense.

(Secretary of the Navy Sullivan congratulates Admiral Denfield on his
appointment as Chief of Naval Operations. PHOTO USN).

His proposals also included the creation of a separate “Air Arm”, turning the army Air Corps into the United States Air Force. These proposals led to what became known as the “unification debates” and the eventual passage of the National Security Act of 1947. He became SECNAV on May 19, 1944, after his immediate superior Secretary Frank Knox passed away from a heart attack. James V. Forrestal led the Navy through the closing year of the war and the painful early years of demobilization that followed. As Secretary, Forrestal introduced a policy of racial integration in the Navy and traveled to combat zones to see naval forces in action. He was in the South Pacific in 1942, present in the Battle at Kwajalein in 1944, and as Secretary observed the Battle of Iwo Jima.

The discussions about unification were intense and played out against a growing threat from Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union. We will get to that turmoil tomorrow, including the speculation about how MR. Forrestal wound up falling from the 13th Floor of the Bethesda Naval Hospital. There are still some questions on that matter that may be entwined in others. More on that tomorrow.

Copyright 2024 Vic Socotra
www.vicsocotra.com

South Pacific in 1942, present at the Battle of Kwajalein in 1944, and (as Secretary) witnessed the Battle of Iwo Jimain 1945.

Secretary of Defense

In 1947, President Harry S. Truman appointed him the first United States Secretary of Defense. Forrestal continued to advocate for complete racial integration of the services, a policy eventually implemented in 1949.

During private cabinet meetings with President Truman in 1946 and 1947, Forrestal had argued against partition of Palestine on the grounds it would infuriate Arab countries who supplied oil needed for the U.S. economy and national defense. Instead, Forrestal favored a federalization plan for Palestine. Outside the White House, response to Truman’s continued silence on the issue was immediate. President Truman received threats to cut off campaign contributions from wealthy donors, as well as hate mail, including a letter accusing him of “preferring fascist and Arab elements to the democracy-loving Jewish people of Palestine.”[7] Appalled by the intensity and implied threats over the partition question, Forrestal appealed to Truman in two separate cabinet meetings not to base his decision on partition, whatever the outcome, on the basis of political pressure.[8] In his only known public comment on the issue, Forrestal stated to J. Howard McGrath, Senator from Rhode Island:

“…no group in this country should be permitted to influence our policy to the point it could endanger our national security.”[9]

Forrestal’s statement soon earned him the active enmity of some congressmen and supporters of Israel. Forrestal was also an early target of the muckraking columnist and broadcaster Drew Pearson, an opponent of foreign policies hostile to the Soviet Union, who began to regularly call for Forrestal’s removal after President Truman named him Secretary of Defense.[10] Pearson told his own protege, Jack Anderson, that he believed Forrestal was “the most dangerous man in America” and claimed that if he was not removed from office, he would “cause another world war.”

Upon taking office as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal was surprised to learn that the administration did not budget for defense needs based on military threats posed by enemies of the United States and its interests. According to historian Walter LaFeber, Truman was known to approach defense budgetary requests in the abstract, without regard to defense response requirements in the event of conflicts with potential enemies.[11] The president would begin by subtracting from total receipts the amount needed for domestic needs and recurrent operating costs, with any surplus going to the defense budget for that year.[11] The Truman administration’s readiness to slash conventional readiness needs for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps soon caused fierce controversies within the upper ranks of the armed forces.[11][12]

At the close of World War II, millions of dollars of serviceable equipment had been scrapped or abandoned rather than appropriate funds for storage costs. New military equipment en route to operations in the Pacific theater was scrapped or simply tossed overboard.[12] Facing the wholesale demobilization of most of the US defense force structure, Forrestal resisted President Truman’s efforts to substantially reduce defense appropriations,[13] but was unable to prevent a steady reduction in defense spending, resulting in major cuts not only in defense equipment stockpiles, but also in military readiness.

By 1948, President Harry Truman had approved military budgets billions of dollars below what the services were requesting, putting Forrestal in the middle of a fierce tug-of-war between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Forrestal was also becoming increasingly worried about the Soviet threat.[14] His 18 months at Defense came at an exceptionally difficult time for the U.S. military establishment: Communist governments came to power in Czechoslovakia and China; the Soviets imposed a blockade on West Berlin prompting the U.S. Berlin Airlift to supply the city; the war between the Arab states and Israel after the establishment of Israel in Palestine; and negotiations were going on for the formation of NATO.

Soviet-inspired Communist takeovers of much of Eastern Europe, Soviet-supported communist military and political campaigns against the governments of Greece, Italy, and France, the impending Communist victory in China, and the invasion of South Korea by communist North Koreawould eventually demonstrate the legitimacy of Forrestal’s concerns, but at the time these were not shared by the President or the rest of his cabinet. Dwight D. Eisenhower recorded he was in agreement with Forrestal’s theories on the dangers of Soviet and International communist expansion. Eisenhower recalled that Forrestal had been “the one man who, in the very midst of the war, always counseled caution and alertness in dealing with the Soviets.” Eisenhower remembered on several occasions, while he was Supreme Allied Commander, he had been visited by Forrestal, who carefully explained his thesis that the Communists would never cease trying to destroy all representative government. Eisenhower commented in his personal diary on 11 June 1949, “I never had cause to doubt the accuracy of his judgments on this point.” [15]

Forrestal also opposed the unification of the military services proposed by the Truman officials. Even so, he helped develop the National Security Act of 1947 that created the National Military Establishment (the Department of Defense was not created as such until August 1949). With the former Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson retiring to private life, Forrestal was the next choice.
There would be controversy about his tenure. Some of it is still going on. More on that tomorrow.