Renouncing the Treaty

As the Japanese make their first hesitant step to deploy troops overseas, it is useful to place things in the context of the last century.

It was 1934, a key date in the world’s slide into black chaos. Japan renounced the Naval treaties of Washington, signed in 1922, and the London accords of 1930. Those documents were the ones that established the limits on what sortof capital ships might be built, and the ratio of such ships in the leading Navies of the world.

The Royal Navy, queen of the seas, was set on a par with the U.S. Navy. The upstart navy of the Empire of Japan was recognized. The ratio was formalized as 5:5:2. But the net effect was not as unbalanced as it might seem. The Royal Navy was confronted by two rival and contradictory missions. It had a vast empire to protect, and the sea lanes between. And it had also been forced to concentrate against the localized might of the German High Seas Fleet in the Great War.

The Americans likewise had two coasts and interests in Asia to patrol. So the British were recognizing a de facto sharing of the responsibility to promote order on the high seas. The Japanese, for their part, achieved a localized superiority, since the Empire began in the home islands.

It was a necessary component to the expansion to come. The blueprint was done, and the army was mobilizing for the greater glory of the Emperor. Tokyo first turned its eyes north, to China. The first step was to utilize thes hort lines of communication to remedy the unfortunate domination of the Middle Kingdom by the Europeans. But that was only a first step.

Once the China Question was resolved, and with a strong Fleet to protect its flanks, the Empire of the Sun could turn its attention south. Then the establishment of the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere could begin in earnest. This would be a concern run by Asians, for Asians.

Copyright 2003 Vic Socotra