There’s a strange fascination in warfare with the idea of killing the enemy’s leader. We often hear talk that: “if General X” (Sultan/Pharoah/King – pick you character in history) was killed, the war would end (or never take place). The favorite such figure is Hitler; if only he’d been killed, the war would never have started, or would’ve ended quickly if he’d been killed during the war.

Conversely, for those opposed to any particular war there’s an equal amount of discussion as to how dire are the consequences if a leader is killed, that this would result in retaliation and escalation.

Yet, for the most part neither argument is true; once nations get involved in a war, the war takes on a life of its own, with its own momentum, its own rationale, one often disassociated from the starting positions of either side. And the further down the chain of command a figure is, the less impact he’ll have on future events, no matter how it may look at the start.

This has certainly been the case in the past two decades.

Year after year the Pentagon has reported that: “the number three man” or the “director of operations for the region…” has been killed in an engagement. But little changed. The death of Usama bin Laden was welcomed by everyone, but didn’t really change the course of the war or US operations in Afghanistan. Even more odd was the death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar – who died of tuberculosis in 2013, but whose death went unnoticed by any until announced by the Taliban in 2015.

Which brings us to US actions in Baghdad a few days ago, in which MG Qasim Soleimani was killed shortly after arriving in Baghdad. Also killed – apparently – was Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy commander of a militia organization known as the Popular Mobilization Forces.

First, let’s be clear on who we’re talking about; Soleimani joined the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) shortly after it was formed in 1979. The IRGC is an internal security force created to protect the Iranian Islamic State from both foreign and internal interference, suppress coups, etc.

Soleimani helped suppress Kurdish separatists in 1979, then, after the Iran – Iraq war began in 1980 (1980 – 1988) led irregular forces inside Iraq. He also took part in several major Iranian operations that, while successful, are known for their abysmal tactics and very high casualty rates. After the war he was named the IRGC commander in his home province of Kerman (north of Bandar Abbas) and then in late 1997 he became the leader of the Al Quds Force, an element within the IRGC tasked with conducting special operations and intelligence gathering outside of Iran. Over the last 22 years the Al Quds Force, under his leadership, has supported (and still supports) Hezballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis in Yemen, Shia militias in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, etc.

We’re also told – courtesy of a once great newspaper in New York – that Soleimani wrote poetry, that he had a soft side. Fine. (History informs us that Hitler loved children (Aryan children at least), was great with dogs, and loved strudel. He was also a fair artist, and never drank or smoked. Oh, yeah, he murdered 11 million people in death camps, and precipitated World War II. That too.)

Under Soleimani, Al Quds forces were responsible for extensive support to anti-regime and anti-US forces in Iraq and throughout the Middle East and North Africa, killing hundreds. Soleimani’s deputy, and now his replacement, BG Esmail Ghaani, has been overseeing Tehran’s support to jihadi elements in Nigeria and the Gambia.

Make no mistake, this is a bad guy, who conducted or supported terrorist operations throughout the region. He was very capable and we’re well rid of him. While his replacement is also capable, he’ll have a difficult time “filling Soleimani’s shoes,” which is good for everyone else.

Nevertheless, we need to remember what’s been happening in Iraq: Shia militia activity has been on the upswing, and only last week they stormed the US embassy and destroyed at least one outer building. Soleimani did not brazenly fly into Baghdad to come see what had happened; he flew into Baghdad to meet with one of his de facto deputies – Abu Mahdi – to discuss what happens next. Abu Mahdi had previously been commander of the Kata’ib Hezballah Militia, an element of the PMF supported by Iran (if that sounds screwy – an Iraqi militia supported by Tehran, that’s because it is), and was responsible for orchestrating the attack on the US embassy last week.

To a certainty more actions were planned; that was the point of Soleimani’s visit. For those worried that this attack will cause an escalation in violence, remember this: the escalation had already begun – initiated by Tehran. Killing Soleimani will not cause any actions, the actions have already been planned and are developing. As Secretary Pompeo noted, the point of our attack was to strike at their command element and thereby “disrupt and deter” future actions.

Whether, in fact, this attack deters future Iranian attacks remains to be seen. But, it will probably disrupt their execution time line, and it certainly takes a very capable commander off the field.

It also sends a signal to the leadership in Tehran that there are red lines and if they cross them there will be consequences.

And it sends a signal to those in Iran who wish to see the Mad Mullahs pushed out of power that there are roadblocks to the Mullahs’ ambitions, and perhaps that will give the resistance in Iran some hope and strength.

For now, the world is better off without Soleimani. As for the rest, well, we’ll see.

Copyright 2020 Arrias
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