Queen Victoria’s 6th Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, oversaw the British Empire at a time when it was nearing its greatest power (a total of 16 years as Foreign Secretary and 9 years as Prime Minister). Palmerston was quite willing to engage in all sorts of foreign actions, sticking the British “nose” into virtually every corner of the globe. Yet, it’s from him that perhaps the clearest guidance on foreign policy can be found: “Countries don’t have friends, countries have interests.”

Hmmmm…

There’s something deeply unsettling about the idea that we’ve walked away from the Kurds who were fighting by our side in northern Syria. Simply put, it feels as if they trusted us and we abused their trust. If feels wrong, dishonorable.

There’s an argument that an enduring US interest is the concept that the US supports freedom and democratic rights everywhere, and that we honor our word, especially when given to those who fight alongside us.

But, while arguments about the Kurds acting as US proxies may resonate, they elide the fact that Kurds were fighting for Kurdish interests. Their interests dovetailed with US interests – until they didn’t. The President has decided they no longer do. You can argue as to whether that’s the case, but the President has the responsibility to define US interests, until and unless a Congress votes to define US interests. (Congress has done this in the past, for example, declaring in 1975 that the President could not provide air support to South Vietnam.)

Walking away from a group that fought with us has happened before and, as today, we’ve felt horrible about it. Consider the Hmong tribesmen of Laos, who fought a “secret war” alongside the US, against North Vietnam. Then we reached a settlement with Hanoi. We can argue about that settlement – and about that war – there being much to argue about. But Laos was never the main theater, Laos was in fact a horribly complex mess that involved a host of unsavory efforts interwoven with more straightforward combat operations, all in support of the war in Vietnam. The US did later take in many Hmong as refugees, but, no matter our promises to the Hmong, once the war ended, the US needed to leave.

The Middle East is, if anything, more confusing than South East Asia. We have forces in Iraq, with whom we have a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). What’s our long-term plan to support Kurds in the region? Kurds seek autonomy from Iraq (and Turkey, Syria and Iran). We can’t support that and at the same time remain allies with Turkey, or support our SFA with Iraq. So, what’s in our interest? What do we walk away from? Turkey remains a NATO ally – and host to several key US Air Force installations. How do we balance Kurd interests with those of our – uncomfortable – ally Turkey?

Return to Vietnam: there were three or four strategic goals that were being pursued in Vietnam (and more broadly in South East Asia) between 1962 and 1973. But the problem with that is that there are few (very few) strategies that can pursue more than one goal at a time. The general rule is: if you identify a goal, and craft a strategy to achieve that goal, then change the goal, you’ll have the wrong strategy, and a goal that you won’t – and can’t – achieve. German Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke (1800 – 1891) summed this up: “errors in strategy can only be corrected in the next war.”

We’re told – repeatedly – the US should never have gone into Iraq in the first place. Should we now leave? We drew a Red Line in the sand in Syria, they crossed it, we didn’t nothing, then we went into Syria and 5 years later – despite a clear intention to not threaten the existing Assad regime – we’re still there. And of course, there’s Afghanistan, where we went to get Al Qaeda (AQ), AQ fled to Pakistan, and then, after we poured billions into Pakistan, and as AQ evolved and grew and spread, we’re still in Afghanistan.

While we struggle to define our national interests, and then develop strategies that can support or achieve those interests, consider this: If something weren’t in Country X’s interest, (or Group X’s interest), would they show up? Consider our allies that are supporting the US in our trade dispute with China. How many are doing so out of concern for the oppressed minorities in China: Uighurs, Tibetans, Falun Gong, etc? How many have made it clear they support the US only after the violence in Hong Kong? How many are doing so despite economic damage to their own economy? And how many are doing so because trade with the US is more important?

Perhaps we need to follow Lord Palmerston’s advice: step back, consider US interests, and, when we have clarity as to what those are – and a sound strategy, press forward. If that requires walking away from a previous promise, than that’s what’s required. But let’s make sure what we’re doing is addressing US national interests.

Copyright 2019 Arrias
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