A number of years ago at a “Principals Only” staff meeting at a 4-star command, the commander asked for recommendations on programs that might be cut as the Pentagon “front office” was hunting for some extra money to do something or other.

After several minutes of silence, one Assistant Chief of Staff signaled he had a suggestion; the 4-star glared at him:

“Yes?”

“Yes, let’s kill the Lessons Learned programs… no one reads them anyway.”

The 4-star was not amused.

> Probably would have saved a few bucks, though.
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> And, as we watch Afghanistan unravel as if following an old movie script, it’s clear that, still, no one is reading the Lessons Learned.
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> The US Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines know how to fight. Anyone who actually thinks about it doesn’t want to get into a straight-up shooting match with any of them. Great weapons, great training, great tactical leadership in the form of superb senior NCOs (Non Commissioned Officers), great logistical support, great C2 (Command and Control) in tactical settings, etc., etc., etc. The US does not lose tactical engagements.
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> This very point was made by one of the great military thinkers the US produced in the past century: Col. Harry Summers, whose study of the Vietnam War remains one of the clearest works analyzing that conflict.
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> Everyone has heard the story: Col. Summers was leading a negotiating team in Hanoi, 1975. He commented to one of the North Vietnamese, Col. Tu, that: “You never defeated us on the battlefield.” Col. Tu replied: “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.”
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> In fact, getting what you want in war is difficult and expensive. Winston Churchill pointed out, more than once, that World War II was started to free Poland, yet with the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1945, Poland was still not free. Poland remained occupied from 1939 until 1989. The Nazis were defeated, true, but the original goals of the war – a free Poland, a free Czechoslovakia – were not achieved for 50 years.
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> Stephen Ambrose has made the argument that to understand what was going on in Europe in the 20th Century consider that all of Europe went through essentially a prolonged civil war that saw the collapse of the Tsar and the Kaiser and the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire, and that only as the 20th century was ending was there some sort of resolution in sight with the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the USSR, and finally Yugoslavia. And one might even argue that the “jury is still out.”
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> In Japan, we fought Japan in a terribly savage war for 3-and-a-half years, a no-holds barred fight that made the war against Germany look civilized, and when we were finished, Japan was pummeled, the government changed, but the Emperor was still on the throne, his grandson is on the same throne today, and Japanese culture remains very much Japanese.
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> The point in all this is that warfare is not clean, or easy, the results rarely match your initial goals, and even when they do, as Clausewitz said, in war the results are never final.
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> Which leaves us where?
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> To begin, Col. Summer’s statement remains accurate. Except for ambushes of small elements, the US does not lose tactical engagements (though that fact ought to give us pause…) Arguably, since the second Chinese counter-attack in Korea in 1952, the US hasn’t lost a battalion sized engagement, and probably hasn’t lost a company sized engagement since Vietnam.
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> Yet, we keep getting involved in combat operations that end without clean victories and often with an unpleasant “after-taste.” What can we do about this?
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> First, it is unlikely that any politicians who end up in one of the senior positions (President, Vice-President, Secretaries of Defense or State) will have understanding and experience in both planning and execution of major combat operations (Eisenhower was an aberration). It’s therefore incumbent on the admirals and generals to act like the professionals they claim to be.
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> There is nothing untoward here. No one should expect the President to understand a whole host of things in detail; he brings in professionals and they advise him.
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> But what should the admirals and general do?
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> 1) Insist on clear goals
> 2) Insist that the goals be clearly in the US interest
> 3) Insist on a declaration of war
> 4) Make sure everyone knows what the assumptions are
> 5) When any of the above changes, get out, or get a new declaration of war
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> If these things don’t happen, resign; not out of indignation, but simple decency. The plan – no plan – will work without the above. No doctor would operate if the patient insisted he wanted to experience the pain, so “no anesthesia!” The professional says: “No, sir.” Our Generals and Admirals need to say: “No, sir, I can’t follow that order,” and then resign. The urge to stay in because “I can reduce the pain and damage by staying in,” is hubris, plain and simple. You need to leave. For those remaining, you need to insist on winnable wars. And there aren’t many of those. One place to begin is to remember we are a maritime power, not a land power.
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> That said, none of these things are likely to happen.
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> As for Afghanistan, the Taliban will recapture Kabul, and they will take control of the countryside, perhaps before the end of the year. They will continue to receive support from the Pakistani government. The countryside of Afghanistan will return to the social structure it has “enjoyed” for much of its inhabited history. There will be a series of dramatic embassy evacuations.
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> And we will continue to chase victories…
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>