The race isn’t always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong… but that’s the way to bet. – Hugh Keough (and Damon Runyon)

The attempted assassination of former President Trump has now had a chance to settle in just a bit, and in capitals around the world I would suspect that there are senior planning teams taking out their portfolios and looking at their assumptions. In as much as who is in the White House impacts the decisions of a number of countries around the world, presumably one of the main assumptions for any plan going forward is how that occupant will react to certain actions. Specifically, if the assumption was that President Biden would be president from January 2025 through January 2029, that assumption has become increasingly questionable, and after the failed assassination, it can be argued that the race is Trump’s to lose.

Whether he wins or loses is something known only to God. But for those who must manage the major plans of our enemies, and even some of our allies, they now really need to take a hard look at their plans in response to what can only be termed – for them – a black swan.

There are many ways to spin this, but what it really comes down to is that the response from Washington for any particular action may well change substantially in 6 months. If the assumption is that Trump’s response will be different – and worse for them – than the Biden administration, then the regimes in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran and Pyongyang have 6 months to act. After that, there will be a new administration in Washington, the responses will be harsher, and the actions of our enemies will be riskier.

So, what might be said in the various capitals over the next week or so?

Starting with perhaps the least problematic of all, North Korea is likely to simply maintain their current operations, to include supplying ammunition to Russia. North Korea, or more specifically, Kim Jon Un, while he did not get what he wanted, received respect from Trump, and in a very real sense, that is what he wants. Kim knows that Trump will negotiate and he probably believes he can get a better “deal” with Trump than from his nominal allies in Beijing and Moscow. Pyongyang will be less of a problem than the other three.

Iran was, from their perspective, badly treated by Trump. He pulled out of the nuclear agreement, he killed Soleimani, he tightened up sanctions, he okayed strikes on Iranian backed elements in Syria, etc. Further, Trump pushed forward the Abraham accords, which if completed, would substantively change the power balance in the Mid East – to Iran’s detriment. It would benefit Iran to further destabilize the region. Possible action: more aid to Hezbollah and the Houthis.

Moscow will have to face a return of Trump with a good deal of trepidation. NATO is now doing what Trump insisted they do – increase defense spending. With a combined GDP of more than $20 trillion (NATO less the US), 2% of GDP works out to more than $400 billion, 125% more than Russia’s defense spending. Add in US defense spending ($800+ billion) as well as US promises to deploy a wide range of new weapons to Europe, and Russia’s problems just got worse.

I would think that Russia will try to increase pressure, increase the tempo of combat operations, and also make every fort to destroy the Ukrainian power grid over the next 6 months, in order to improve their bargaining position once Trump insists on negotiations.

As for Ukraine, while Trump has insisted he will end the war, that is, despite handwringing, not necessarily a good thing for Russia. Yes, Russia would probably, under a negotiated cease-fire, retain most of what they now hold. But the likely end state would be a DMZ like Korea’s, armed and mined to the teeth, and a de facto end to Russian western expansion for several generations. In as much as this war has been going on – not for 2-and-a-half years, not for 10 years – but for 350 years, a 50 – 75 year (or more) ceasefire is probably not a bad thing.

And, it should not go with comment: ending the hot war phase of the situation in Ukraine will free up spending. The opportunity cost of fudging that war is egregious. Money spent on Ukraine – necessary as it may be, could be spent on US shipyards, stockpiles of war-at-sea weapons, advanced training with our Pacific and Indian Ocean allies, etc., etc., etc.

China is, of course, the “million dollar” question. The planners in Beijing, the fellows advising Emperor Xi, recognize that they now face an interesting dilemma: if they assess that a Trump administration will act more forcefully than the Biden administration, AND they assess that Trump will act to improve the US and Allied balance of power in the Western Pacific, and that he will move quickly to bring the US defense industrial base back to health, then they need to act now, or push the decision out past January 2029.

Emperor Xi turned 71 last month. Does he count on continued health and push the “glory” of unification out another 5 years? And what about all the rumors of China’s poor economic health? What about the $11 trillion in additional debt that has made recent headlines? What about many countries and companies moving their business out of China? It’s not yet out of control, but a Trump administration might make it so.

For Xi, the question then may well come down to a fairly straightforward question – though not a straightforward answer. Obviously China would like to gain control of Taiwan at no cost. But, there are several issues here, and Xi is at the center of them. First and foremost, everyone needs to remember that there is no giant war game console that will tell them “you can’t win today” and therefore they won’t go.

If Xi believes that his forces are now invincible, it matters not a tinker’s damn whether in fact they are. Does he have the actual power to start a war or would there be resistance from the Army? We can never know to a certainty. But it seems hard to imagine at this point, especially in light of the recent purges, that he does not have all the power. My guess is that if ordered, they would go.

The other part of that question is: would they succeed?

And the costs – both the immediate costs, and the consequences worked wide – would be huge. Maybe, in the end, Xi’s hubris, his ego, his desire to outshine Mao, would push him to go anyway and the next 6 months are the window. My guess here is that it is going to be a tremendous temptation for Xi to try when the right weather arrives (late summer and into fall).

Some of his advisors will counsel against it, noting the huge costs of a Western world that would shut out China. All in all, I would say this is a toss up – Xi will wait to see the political fall-out from this assassination attempt over the next month. If Trump looks more certain, he is going to be more tempted. If the US looks more divided, he will wait.

So, some possible fallout from this black swan event… I hope I’m wrong pretty much across the board and everyone just stays quiet… But, that’s not the way to bet.

Copyright 2024 Arrias

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