As I’m sure you know, two years into the war President Zelenskyy just dismissed his senior general and is calling for a new strategy. What might that mean?

Begin at the beginning: Russia invaded on as poor a net assessment of the enemy as can be imagined. It was as far off as Hannibal’s assessment of what would happen if he invaded the Italian peninsula. Russia – the Kremlin – believed that if they simply showed up the Ukrainian government would fold and they could install some sort of collaborationist or puppet regime.

Field Marshall Helmut von Moltke (the Elder) used to comment that “errors in tactics can be corrected in the next battle, errors in strategy can only be corrected in the next war,” and Russia started off this war with a truly strategic error. On top of that are a series of other issues that Russia continues to face: The Ukrainian army is fighting for its homeland against invaders (though there are elements of the Russian army that view the Donbas as part of Russia – doesn’t matter who is right, this is a question of belief and morale); Ukraine has the relative luxury of being able to declare martial law and fully mobilize; Russia cannot. Ukraine also has the benefit of shorter supply lines from the rear to the front lines.

And, Ukraine has NATO and the US backing it.

Add on top of that the numbers: Russia with a population just under 150 million, has not had a full mobilization, and had at the start of the war a healthier economy than Ukraine. Between the mobilization and its higher unemployment rate, Ukraine has, on a nominal population of 43 million (but closer to 33 million), raised an army of 880,000 – all of whom are, obviously, in Ukraine. Russia has not fully mobilized – they are practicing partial call-ups every 6 months, and has some 600,000 men committed to Ukraine, with about 400,000 actually inside Ukraine. Said differently, Ukraine has anywhere from 50% to 100% more troops on the battlefield than does Russia.

Some time in the spring of 2022, within several months of the start of the war – having withdrawn from the greater Kyiv area, Russia started to change the plan. Normally, this sort of thing leaves invading armies in tatters, veritably “changing horses in mid-stream” – which is what Moltke was saying. Russia still suffered losses where they had overextended themselves (around Kharkiv as well as west of the Dnepr River), but they started to fix that as well, and built defensive lines and exchanged tactics that didn’t work for simpler, more cautious tactics that took longer, but had lower risk of failure.

In November 2022 Russian decision-making began to reflect a goal of causing Ukrainian army casualties as at least as important an objective as taking terrain. Shortly after this was, I believe, the first time that Gen. Zaluzhnyi told President Zelenskyy he wanted to withdraw from Bakhmut, pointing out that the town was of no intrinsic military value; the request was denied.

The Russian army built defensive lines, as the Ukrainian army brought in newly trained troops and more advanced weaponry. The Russians withdrew from west of the Dnepr River, and in some places were pushed back (the Ukrainian counter-stroke around Kharkiv was a very well executed operation but they didn’t have the logistics or the total forces necessary to keep it going). By the time the Ukrainian army began its counterattack last summer, the Russian defensive positions were ready and the amount of terrain regained was very small, and the overall expense was quite large.

Disregarding the propaganda figures that pour out of both the Ukrainian and Russian armies on a daily basis, casualty estimates suggest the cost to the Ukrainians for the unsuccessful counter-attack was quite high. Russian losses were also high, but not as high as the Ukrainians. And the Russians benefitted by learning what parts of their lines were weak and are now reportedly strengthening and improving their defensive lines.

Russian forces have also – slowly – learned how to better protect ammo dumps and supply dumps, they have had some better successes in dispersing command posts (though some glaring failures as well) and both sides have improved their air defense responses and made the flight of manned aircraft over the battlefield a high risk event.

But, clearly, things are not where President Zelenskyy wants them. Upset over the failure of the summer counter-offensive, and the loss of several notable (but strategically unimportant) towns (Soledar, Bakhmut, Marinka) the possible loss of Avdiivka in the next few months, and also because of Zaluzhnyi’s public statement that the army needed another 450,000 – 500,000 soldiers, President Zelenskyy dismissed the General and replaced him with Gen Syrskyi, even as he has called for a “reboot” of their strategy and said that other personnel are going to be dismissed (he also dismissed the Veteran’s Affairs minister, and replaced the Defense Minister last September).

Which leaves them where?

The war remains one of attrition – and that means ammunition and soldiers. As part of the effort to overcome the Russian advantage in ammo (howitzer) production, Zelenskyy has made a point of saying Ukraine will expand drone production this year to 1 million drones, most being small “suicide” drones. Essentially they’re replacing artillery (155MM howitzers) with small drones; Russia is trying to keep up in this drone war. Both sides are also working on the use of various electronic warfare (EW) means to disable the enemy drones. It’s difficult to see beyond the deliberate efforts to hide various capabilities, but it appears the Ukrainians have a slight advantage in their drones, the Russians have a slight advantage in their EW systems.

Overall, the war continues to underline the capability of defensive systems. Whether it’s anti-tank systems (Javelin et al, followed by suicide drones), layered surface-to-air missiles systems, extremely dense mine fields, extremely tough bunkers and fighting positions, and the ever-present artillery support (on the order of 10,000 rounds per day for Russia, 2,000 rounds per day for Ukraine), this is a war that’s showcasing modern military technology that allows more rapid detection and targeting of moving troops, and the weaponry to accurately respond to that target task.

Accordingly, while the new Ukrainian CINC (Gen. Syrskyi) will try to develop new plans, while hoping to get new assets from NATO and the US, it will be difficult to manage any sort of rapid, elegant offensive that liberates eastern Ukraine. Remember too, that Syrskyi was in command of the Army, and this is a ground war. There is not much room for change. Further, the Russian tactic of very slow – ponderous – offensives that have killed tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers, and reduced to rubble very heavily fortified towns such as Soledar and Marinka, is not one that will be easily stopped. Zelenskyy will want to see some sort of success, and there may be an effort to put together a small offensive at some point along the line – perhaps at the northern end of the line, near the eastern town of Kupyansk – but at this point Ukraine, like the Russians, would have a difficult time exploiting any breakthrough.

As it now stands, the Russian tactic is slow, ugly, brutish, and working. At the same time, the Russians seem to have zero interest in improved relations with the West. The result is that this war is going to grind on, chewing up Ukrainians and Russians, and the Ukrainian countryside; there is little likelihood for any break-throughs by either side, and little chance, given the current leadership, that they will reach a negotiated settlement in the next 12 months.

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