Arrias: Strategic Catastrophe

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the Elder, mastermind of the Franco-Prussian War (among others), said that “Errors in tactics can be corrected on the next battle, but errors in strategy can only be corrected in the next war.”

By strategy, he meant the overarching war plan of a nation. And his point was that if you get the nation moving, but in the wrong direction, you will find correcting your mistake nearly impossible in your current war.

When the west, and in particular the US, did nothing of real note when Russia occupied Crimea, February 2014, I sent a note to a friend that we had just witnessed the death of Ukraine, at least Ukraine as defined in 1991 after the break-up of the USSR. I thought it might take quite a while to completely play out, a decade or more, perhaps even a generation, but the seeds had been sown, the strategic mistake had been made.

Of course, the real seed of that mistake had been sown in three Memoranda signed in 1994 in which the US, Russia and the UK provided security “assurances” to Ukraine in exchange for transfer or destruction of all their nuclear weapons.

That the US gave a security “assurance” to Ukraine is of note, as State Department lawyers insisted on that word, rather than an “agreement.” In diplo-speak a “security guarantee” implies a military response in the event a third party breeches the agreement; a “security assurance” does no such thing. A “security assurance” really falls into the realm of “we promise we’ll seriously talk about it if something bad happens.”

But Ukraine accepted, and our strategic mistake became theirs as well.

Still, there was the hope (again, hope is not a plan) that if Ukraine were in some way threatened, the US and Europe would act in a definitive way to protect Ukraine’s territory; that was shown to be false when, in February 2014, Russia occupied Crimea.

Note, it really doesn’t matter what previous claims Russia had on Crimea; documents had been signed, the borders were formally recognized by virtually every country on earth, to include Russia; ergo, Russia was clearly in the wrong.

Looking back, most of the last 30 years were a strategic catastrophe for the US and Western civilization. Presented in the 1990s with an unprecedented opportunity: a world mostly at peace and a single power clearly dominant in every respect, the US, instead of building sensible relationships and a network of stable, sustainable security structures that could have peacefully contained both Russia and China, and using the period of relative peace to get our economic house in order, squandered the opportunity in nearly every respect, funded China’s expansion, and set the parameters for our own economic and social woes.

Our strategy mis-played the “Global War On Terror” and we ended up overextending ourselves and making a series of poor investments in any number of weapon systems even as we seemed determined to bankrupt our own economy.

As for Ukraine specifically, we need to ask if this could this have been prevented even after the errors of 1994. It is, of course, impossible to prove. But, if the US had acted forcefully in 2014 might the current war been prevented? We’ll never know, but what we do know is that nothing serious was really tried. Russia seized Crimea on February 27th, 2014. It has been suggested that this was really in response to the ouster of the Russian-friendly President Yanukovych, but the ouster of the President of Ukraine, whether you think it right or wrong, in no way justifies Russia’s seizure of Crimea.

Some sanctions were leveled against Russia but, as we’ve seen, sanctions really don’t have much impact when the county being sanctioned covers 6 million square miles, and the 2nd largest economy in the world (China) turns a de facto blind eye to things.

The lack of a forceful response from the West, in particular the US, was an implied green light to what followed: the war in the Donbas, which began less than 2 months later (April 2014) and, for all intents and purposes, continues to this day.

Even then, might a strong response from President Biden in January 2022 have prevented the Russian invasion? Again we can’t know. But the horrific US departure from Kabul 6 months prior, and the bizarre comment in January that the US response might be limited “if it is just a minor incursion,” sent a signal to Moscow that was interpreted as an opportunity to be exploited. Lager President Biden did try to walk back the remark but it was too late: Moscow had heard what they wanted.

The question that now begs answering is: what is now possible?

It’s been argued by some that if the US had flooded Ukraine with all the weapons they needed, within the first 6 months, they might have forced Russia out. Perhaps, though the tactical reality of attacking into Crimea would make that a complex problem. But in any case, there were talks and nearly a ceasefire that spring, but then the UK and US convinced – or pressured – Kyiv to walk away.

When the Ukrainian army forced the Russians across the Dnepr River, and away from Kharkiv, there might have been an opportunity for negotiating a favorable ceasefire. But, Ukraine attacked south in the summer of 2023 and were further pulled into the war of attrition. Russia doubled down on attrition around Bakhmut and both sides suffered heavy casualties. That Russia used thousands of penal colony troops and accepted the losses was met by a Ukrainian army that accepted attrition rather than give any ground; against a population 4 times as large, Ukraine engaged in attrition war.

And so on. This August Ukraine attacked across the border hoping to force the Russians to shift forces. Since then the Russians have taken 570 sq.mi. of terrain.

And most recently both sides have climbed further up the “escalation ladder,” culminating this week with the use of an IRBM (really an ICBM) with non-nuclear warheads assign a Ukrainian facility. And yes, that cut Baltic Sea cable is part of it.

In fact, for 33 months both sides have slowly and steadily climbed the escalation ladder and no one has really tried to stop it.

Meanwhile, there’s an interesting chorus of policy gurus in the west who insist Putin has no intention of using nuclear weapons. Perhaps he doesn’t. Or perhaps he didn’t when he started. I don’t know what his real use criteria is, but in fact, neither do any of the security experts who claim to know his mind. What we do know is that clearly it has not been reached, as he has not used a nuclear weapon yet.

But what is also clear is that the world is closer now to the use of a nuclear weapon that we were in 2021. Whoever the adults are who claim to be in charge, they have made the world a more dangerous place.

Which leaves us where?

Simply put, this war must be brought to a conclusion. The doyens of foreign policy have misplayed their hand long enough. Now we face what appears to be a frustrated Putin. Yes, he is a thug. Yes, he started this. Yes, he is violating international law. And yes, he has 5,000 ready nuclear weapons. The last point is the most important point. And yes, he put a missile down range a free days ago that should’ve gotten everybody’s attention.

This needs to stop. The Biden administration has no leverage at this point. So, President Trump needs to be given a free hand and all the support possible to push this war to a ceasefire. That includes all of NATO and the rest of the EU. And Zelenskyy must also understand his maneuvering room is very limited. Trump has leverage to extract concessions from Putin.

But everyone needs to understand they need to give a little, and let Trump and his team walk the world back from the edge. We are far too close and this needs to end.

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Written by Vic Socotra