It is a week jammed with anniversaries, some of them a little disquieting. Today, for example, is VE Day- “Victory in Europe, 1945” as we also observe something unfolding in Europe again some eight decades later. We will talk about that tomorrow, in the context of Russia’s observation of the Soviet Victory Day that we hope is not a forecast. But one element of that is on orbit above us this morning.

We are trying not to be too alarmist in analyzing the situation, since our information is derived from information streams intended to cause reaction. But recognition of the streams and their purpose is part of the attempt to conduct our affairs in a situation in which a recent Rasmussen poll indicates “Likely voters” (1,100 actual samples representing 100 million notional voters) consider a civil war in America is likely (47-49% “Likely” or “Unlikely”).

Results are part of an election year flurry of messaging bounded by a five-year event horizon. Personally, we think it more likely represents some trouble in messaging before November. Views of course diverge on that matter. Concern about it emerged in the weekly business development last week, which is normally more on bid-and-proposal issues. For messaging? The memories of ancient victories competes with current kinetic events on unknown trajectories.

There was some background noise in messaging that included information on nuclear weapons. That has popped in and out of the news memes since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. That layer of nuclear noise lies uneasy against the longer campaign against nuclear power, which we are supposed to fear while plastering the landscape with wind-farms and solar panels.

The percentages of use for both is a bit daunting, since solar is only useful when the sun is shining, and the wind produces only about 35% of the power rating stamped on the capacity plates. It don’t always blow when you need it, you know? And they have to be replaced every fifteen to twenty years, charitably. Without re-cycling, since the blades and concrete to support the towers can’t be.

You have already heard the anti-nuke power meme most of your life if you are an adult. It started with mis-information, which is a combination of true things like the disasters at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island and alarmism. The whole story should include safe operating of much of our Navy on nuclear power for a half-century. It was of little concern to work and live with them.

The messaging parallels the account of Russian interference in the 2016 election we heard about for nearly two years, interfering with establishing a working government after Hillary’s ignominious defeat at the hands of a sometimes controversial game-show host. It was true, to a degree. The 51 former IC officials who declared the story to have had “classic Russian characteristics” were accurate. They just did not say who actually was using those tactics.

We know now, but that bit of chicanery has now been shunted off as just “old news.” The technique in strategic messaging has evolved a bit as well, but relies on finding a statement of some truth, and then beating it into consonance with the message you actually want to convey. And to which you want a desired response.

That sums of the whole intent of the next book in progress at Socotra House. We have a draft title for the work that is along the lines of “Life at the Fall of Rome.” In it, we attempt to apply some objective analysis to the hysterical messaging streams and make sense of who wants us to believe what, from moment to moment. We are trying to capture the direct impact of that messaging on the decision-making that will rule the next few months.

Or maybe the fate of the world.

That is part of the current nuke issue. It contains several active messaging streams, The oldest of those is the energy part, of course. It has been effective, and curtailed reactor development around the world. That is only one aspect of the current atomic controversy. The other is a reprise of even older horrors, going back to the Cuban Missile Crisis. We lived with images of atom clouds in grade-school and their lingering impact all our adult lives..

The US and the Russians played that game to vast extent across the Cold War. The publicized numbers of the nuke inventories the two nations built is mind-boggling, and the nukes remained after the Soviet Union fell. 6,000 is the reported number in the Kremlin arsenal, plus the missiles, bombers and submarines required to launch them.

The Press asserts the US reportedly maintains about 4,000 nukes and the inventory of systems to deliver them. That was the old balance of power, with other much smaller inventories in places like the UK and France. A recurrent theme is from China, with their aggressive building program that would place it as the third largest nuclear power. That had previously been in the “what if” category of nuclear discussion. The Ukraine conflict has brought a new aspect to that discussion.

This one is about the Russians, whose war has not played out the way Mr. Putin had intended. Considering the arsenal in his possession, the question then became what role it might have in resolving an intractable WW-1 style conflict. The traditional answer has always been a binary one, with “peace” determined by the mutual reluctance to end civilization. Considering the amount of resources devoted to simply maintaining the respective inventories, of weapons and delivery systems, the temptation for strategic planners abounds. It turned naturally to exploration of using them in a manner that secured advantage without engulfing the world stage in flames.

You could say that this phase is playing out now. At the business meeting there were some comments about what is means in terms of the concept of the old term “escalation.” For those who have been in the nuclear business, old concepts reappeared. One of them discussed was use of atomic detonations not to directly strike ground targets. Instead, the intent would be to detonate something high in the atmosphere that would produce a pulse of electromagnetic energy (EMP) powerful enough to fry the circuits of all electronic devices within the immense line-of site dependent on height of the blast.

You can see there could be room for confusion in executing that scenario, depending on the number of devices launched (or carried) in a demonstration that could rapidly transform into mass exchange. The inclination would thus be to minimize the possibility of catastrophe by demonstrating a capability rather than initiation of a massive first strike. There are other approaches, of course.

Last week the controversy was about what may be another trial balloon launched by the planners. We had to poke around a bit, since the discussion about “atomic escalation” includes a new nuclear calculus. An increasing number of powers are at the threshold of acquiring nuclear arsenals, and their experience is not 80 years in duration, but “maybe next week.” Most notable (at this moment) is Israel (confirmed a dozen weapons) and Iran (getting to within 6% of the enrichment necessary for a fission-based weapon). India, Pakistan and North Korea are in the mix as well, with the possibility that possession of a single weapon could spark discussion of how it might be used.

Despite having the largest inventory on Earth, Russia’s mostly conventional adventure in Ukraine has been littered with failure. In terms of messaging, it is not surprising that Putin has had to wave the nuke banner around, since it represents one area of undisputed leadership. But it also carries the risk that attended the long Cold War. The question is: what lies between the current situation and sudden mass obliteration?

That is one of the matters flying about this week. The use of nukes for an EMP attack still has a highly visible effect on the earth below. Is there another means of performing an atomic demonstration without directly attacking the homelands of the opposition? A way to convey the intensity of emotion without direct assault? What about a weapon directed not at targets on earth, but in the heavens above. Perhaps things on low earth orbit, like satellites that collect and disseminate information? Or provide the GPS data that enables efficient drones to accurately evade and conventionally hit targets on the battlefield.

That could demonstrate resolve and capability without hitting earthly targets (directly) and no humans (except possibly those on the International Space Station) scorched.

You can see something demonstrated on orbit would represent a new space in the definition of escalation. Options now? Heated rhetoric. Next? Transition from the reported “testbed system” on orbit to a dramatic single detonation? Here is what is floating around this week:

“U.S. government officials have indicated Russia already has some kind of clandestine testbed in space as part of its development of a “nuclear-armed low-earth orbit (LEO) anti-satellite weapon.”

That would present a new spectrum in the nuclear game that side-steps deterrence and limits targets to high-value but extraterrestrial objects.

This comes just days after another senior official warned Congress that this “indiscriminate” weapon could be capable of rendering the LEO completely unusable for a prolonged period of time.

We are not claiming that is likely or inevitable, but we do know people have been thinking hard about how to transition nukes from the “end of the world” scenario to an employable tool in warfare not on earth but in the heavens.

Some of those capabilities are reported to be in the process of deployment now. We will be watching with interest to see the messaging that will come as a new strategic space is filled with deadly capabilities.

Copyright 2024 Vic Socotra
www.vicsocotra.com