Gentle Readers,

Sometimes something comes over the transom that is worth passing along. For example, my Cajun pal Boats often chimes in with some interesting commentary from Louisiana, a component of what he calls “Greater Texas,” a mysterious world in which the follies of Washington seem completely dispensable.

In the case of the below article this morning, a distinguished former comrade from the Office of Naval Intelligence has taken a look at a long-ago time, when the Berlin Wall was still being sledge-hammered into stones. The Department of Defense was attempting to understand the future in the context of the consignment of the Soviet Empire to the ash-heap of history.

There were a variety of agendas being played out in those days, following the inconclusive conclusion of Operation DESERT STORM. One was a reduction in civilian personnel in the intelligence community that contributed in no small regard to the surprise of 9/11. I am not sure it would have been any different had things played out with other priorities, but this account of a contrarian view of the future is one that resonates powerfully with the annexation of Crimea by Mr. Putin, and the current threat to what remains of Ukraine.

Bill Manthorpe is a retired Navy Captain, intelligence, and later a Senior Executive Service officer and Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence. His contributions to the nation are indisputable, and his insight is profound. We thought you might find it of interest.

There will be a special bonus errata edition of The Daily coming along as well, so, in the words of the immortal Paul Harvey, “Stand by for News!”

Vic

Putin Proves ONI Right
William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr.

Introduction

The recent Russian invasion and takeover of the Crimea, a part of the neighboring sovereign state of Ukraine, has surprised U.S. and NATO strategic decision-makers. There are some people, however, who should not be surprised. Unfortunately, most of them are retired and no longer engaged in national security matters. In addition to “old Russia hands,” they should include now-retired Navy four-star and three-star admirals, many other retired naval officers, congressional staffers and members of national security “think tanks.” Those are the people who, in 1992, heard an ONI briefing that provided a “spot-on” forecast of the timing of Putin’s action, if not the specific location.

Background

In 1989 and 1990 the Berlin Wall was destroyed and the Germanys were united, marking the beginning of the end of the Soviet empire. The Soviet Union was dissolved on 26 December 1991, leading to the independence of the 12 former Soviet republics and the end of the Soviet Union as the dominant power on the Eurasian continent.

As these events unfolded, and with the Gulf War underway, President George H.W. Bush spoke of the emergence of “A New World Order” and its implications for the U.S.[1] <#_edn1> That concept was soon being hotly debated in the U.S. foreign affairs community.[2] <#_edn2> In April 1991, after the Gulf War was concluded, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) published The Way Ahead as a vision to guide the Navy into the future.[3] <#_edn3> To guide the development of a Navy-Marine Corps team to implement that vision, the CNO and CMC commissioned a Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort (NFCPE) consisting of five flag officers, captains and colonels, supported by staff members from the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA). In the fall of 1991, as they began their effort, the leaders of the NFCPE requested that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) provide a threat brief.

ONI had already been thinking about the future threat in wake of the changed world situation. In July of 1991, the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) had been provided with the draft of an unclassified staff analysis entitled “Anticipating the Future Threat”. Upon the DNI’s approval, the draft formed the basis for a briefing given to the NFCPE in October.

The Briefing

That briefing used a single “generic” graphic titled “Assumptions” “…to illustrate the changing level of the intentions and capabilities of both ROW [rest of the world] nations and global powers to pose challenges amounting to a total threat to the U.S. over time.” Those “assumptions” about the threat were based “not on any intelligence” but “…on a familiarity with the events occurring in the world today and a sense of history which permits an extrapolation into the future.” The graphic illustrated and the briefing concluded that, with the Soviet threat and Gulf War in the past,:
Whereas, once we could do all your planning against a single ever-increasing threat, now we must do;
-operational planning against a residual Soviet threat and remaining ROW threat.
-near term program planning against a greatly diminished overall threat but a steadily growing ROW threat which is leading toward an inevitable confrontation.
-mid-term program planning to meet a real ROW threat and to hedge against a revived global threat.
-long-term R&D planning against an overall threat that some 20 years from now, will be as great as the threats we have faced in the past.

When describing the graphic, the briefer said;

History shows that we will have to respond to regional crises or contingencies every so often….
Further, it appears that at about every 15 years one of those ROW crises or contingencies becomes a major conflict for the U.S….
In about that same period, furthermore, the global threat will be starting to revive….
While it is hard to say how long the remnants of the Soviet Union will stay divided, in turmoil and incapable of exercising any military power after the collapse is complete, the collapse and revival of great powers seems to occur over a 20 year period….
If it is not the Soviet Union that returns 20 years hence…it will be some Eurasian power or coalition of powers including parts of what was once the Soviet Union….[4] <#_edn4>

The Response to the Briefing

Others did not agree with this depiction of the future. One staff member at CNA, then assisting the NFCPE, later wrote that the graphic “…was quite simple in form—almost iconic…” in that it “…captured the essence of the emerging debate within the U.S. military and the future security environment and the choices we faced as a nation.” Clearly ONI “…had a particular vision in mind.” “I disagreed with that vision, yet I couldn’t take my eyes off the slide…. As far as ONI was concerned “The Russians might have exited stage right for now…but if history was a guide….then the Russians would probably become resurgent within a twenty-year time frame….”[5] <#_edn5> The surprising simplicity of the “Global Threat” and “ROW challenges” curves on that slide also captured the attention of the members of the NFCPE and made it “…the Rorschach test against which all visions could be tested” and the group “debated it endlessly….”.[6] <#_edn6>

ONI Sticks to Its Guns

Because of that debate, in March 1992 the DNI wrote a memo to the CNO stating;

Enclosure (1) provides some unclassified words and a graphic upon which to base a discussion of the future threat.
We originally developed these assumptions for our backup discussions with the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort (NFCPE). Subsequently, we used them in several other seminars and in my posture statement and follow-on discussions. We have used them as the basis for discussions with OSD, JCS and Hill Staffers…..
….they are forwarded for your information, your use as desired, and in case you hear it from someone else.[7] <#_edn7>

Upon receiving the memo, the CNO asked for more details on the rise and fall of threats.[8] <#_edn8> In April, after a review and validation process, the DNI forwarded a memo with several enclosures providing an historical review that supported the briefing and graphic. That memo stated that, with respect to the ROW threat;

…there has always been a low level of turmoil in the rest of the world…every so often, one of those events turned into a crisis….
The “every so often,” however cannot be shown to be every 15 years. That timing appears to be more an artifact of the conduct of modern U.S. politics and foreign policy and the result of our own initiatives….

With respect to the “global threat” the memo pointed out that “In brief, we found that;

The European political/military structure clearly abhors a vacuum.
The periods during which dominant powers remain dominant can vary greatly….But based on 500 years of historical analysis [illustrated in enclosures to the memo] the period between the fall of one dominant power and the rise of another do appear to be fairly regular….it is possible to identify an approximate ten year period from the event marking the end of the first power’s dominance and an event marking the turning point where it or another power dominant power began to ascend. Likewise, from that turning point it is possible to identify another approximate ten year period before an event occurs marking the claim of the second power to dominance.

The DNI concluded that;

This historical review has confirmed our assumption that there will be a continuing level of turmoil in the rest of the world….but more importantly, it has confirmed our assumption that, with the end of Soviet dominance in Europe, the level of threat should not be expected to drop for long or stay low forever. If the historical pattern of succession of dominant powers is repeated, there will be a turning point in about 10 years and approximately ten years after that another power will reach its dominance. [9] <#_edn9>

Having set forth the ONI position and validated it for the CNO, the DNI cautioned;, “This is not intended to be a ‘prediction’…. Rather, it should be treated as a long range ‘forecast’ or ‘assumption’ based on historical patterns.

The ONI “Assumptions” in 20-20 Hindsight

To assess the general accuracy of the ONI forecast one need only to look at the graphic and consider the events of the past 20 years. The Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, the turning point occurred about 10 years later after Vladimir Putin was first elected in 1999. As he began his efforts to revive Russian influence, the U.S. attention was diverted to the ROW in the Iraq and Afghan Wars. During that period, by actions in Chechnya and Georgia, Putin demonstrated the rise of Russian regional power and, now by his actions in the Crimea, Russia has begun its rise to toward becoming the dominant power on the Eurasian continent and posing a threat to its eastern neighbors and NATO.

Conclusions

ONI was right! But few remember.[10] <#_edn10> That situation brings into question the utility of long-range threat forecasts. If those forecasts do not become part of the intelligence organization’s “institutional memory” to be reviewed, updated or revised every few years, then the effort of the analysts has been wasted. More importantly, the organization will be surprised like everyone else when the inevitable occurs, having missed the opportunity to provide timely and relevant intelligence.


[1] <#_ednref1> George H. W. Bush, Toward a New World Order, Speech to Joint Session of Congress, September 11, 1990.
[2] <#_ednref2> See Foreign Affairs, Spring 1991, December 1991, January 1992.
[3] <#_ednref3> Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2007 (Arlington, VA; Center for Naval Analysis, 2007).
[4] <#_ednref4> Text of ONI Brief “Threat Assumptions” and graphic “Assumptions” dated October 1991. Enclosure 1 to Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject “Future Threats.” Serial 092B/2U546167 dated 11 March 1992.
[5] <#_ednref5> Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York: G.P. Putnam &Sons,2004), 65, 67, 68. “Personal Reflections” on this book by the author were published in the Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly, Fall 2005 and Winter 2006.
[6] <#_ednref6> Ibid, 69. That debate was described on the slides for a CNA presentation by Henry H. Gaffney and Thomas P. M. Barnett “The Insiders’ Debate on U.S. National Security Policy: Three ‘Visions,” dated 27 August 1992 .
[7] <#_ednref7> Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject “Future Threats.” Serial 092B/2U546167 dated 11 March 1992.
[8] <#_ednref8> CNO Action Item, Subject: Future Threats, 00Control # 2UD80723 of 25 March 1992.
[9] <#_ednref9> Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject “Historical Review.” Serial 092B/2U546361 of 20 April 1992.
[10] <#_ednref10> One who did remember was Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski. He heard the presentation when serving as a member of the CNO’s Strategic Study Group. In 1999 when serving as President of the Naval War College, in February 1999 the gave a presentation “The Road Ahead…21st Century Navy” to an All Flag Officers Conference convened by the CNO. In his address he reminded the Navy that “…the period between the devolution of one hegemonic power in Eurasia and the appearance of the next has never been more than twenty years.” See “President’s Notes” in Naval War College Review LII, no. 3 (September 1999), 8.