This account of the decision to home-port a USN aircraft carrier is from Naval Intelligence legend John Niemeyer, a national treasure. He relieved me in VF-151 in mid-1980, and did a memorable job as a Midway officer. He liked the Japan experience of the Overseas Family Residency Program (OFRP) a little better than most. He is still in Yokosuka, nearly a half century later.

Vic

Subject: Oral history …. How USS MIDWAY came to be forward-deployed to Japan

Excerpt from a longer (fascinating) article …. Provided FYI, in case you hadn’t seen it already…

Cheers from Yokosuka,

John Niemeyer

= = = = = = = = = =

Link:

James Auer Interview (gwu.edu)

– – – – –

MURATA: I would like you to tell us about the origin of Japanese participation in RIMPAC. But before that, could you discuss some of the important issues that came up while you were serving as Japan Director.
AUER: If I can relate very quickly before I do that, through some unusual circumstances I played the role as a “go-between” on the homeporting of the U.S.S. MIDWAY in Japan in 1973. A decision had been made by the Nixon National Security Council to homeport an aircraft carrier in Japan. The rationale may have been strategic, but a lot of the rationale may have also been budgetary. The U.S. was sending two aircraft carriers on a permanently rotating basis to the Mediterranean Sea in the 6th Fleet and two or three to the 7th Fleet. The costs of such rotation, both the budgetary cost and an even greater cost in human family separation because the Pacific Ocean is bigger and because the Pacific was the major naval theater of operations, were great. The families of the crew members, particularly in the case of enlisted sailors, in a two or three year period, were separated for maybe a year and a half. So this put great strains on the families, particularly young families, and there were also the financial costs of operations to consider. Thus, for strategic and budgetary reasons, it was decided to homeport a carrier in Japan.

It was the State Department’s perception that Japan didn’t feel so terribly threatened in the 1960s, when the National Security Council made this decision. And the State Department said that Japan may not like this. But this was an NSC decision so State’s job was to gain Japanese acceptance. Ambassador Ingersoll, and DCM Dick Sneider were the senior Americans in Tokyo. I was a lieutenant commander assigned to a newly created position of Political Adviser at Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan Headquarters. Just before the NSC made the decision to homeport an aircraft carrier in Japan, the U.S. government had announced, for another set of budgetary reasons, that the U.S. Navy would virtually pull out of Japan. The U.S. base at Yokosuka was going to be closed. The cruiser which was flagship of the Seventh Fleet was to move to Sasebo. The shipyard in Yokosuka was to close and the U.S. Navy was to have virtually nothing in Yokosuka and only a small presence in Sasebo. Within six months that policy was superseded since the budgetary situation was not as serious as had been thought. And in fact, the U.S. decided it would like to stay in Yokosuka and homeport an aircraft carrier there. Because this drawdown decision had been announced, the State Department believed perhaps more strongly that the Japanese would find it difficult to tolerate such a U.S. action, i.e., to base an aircraft carrier in Yokosuka.

Prior to being assigned as Political Adviser in Yokosuka, I was a PhD research student writing a history of the Maritime Self-Defense Force. I had done my Master’s thesis under Professor Edwin O. Reischauer. I had been able to get declassified the fact that during the Korean War, a number of former Imperial Japanese Navy minesweepers, which had been kept on active duty to sweep mines, were sent to Korea under the order of the U.S. Occupation. A rear admiral, by the name of Arleigh Burke, who just died at the age of 95 on January 1 of this year (1996), was then the deputy Occupation naval commander under Vice Admiral Turner Joy. Admiral Burke went to Okubo Takeo, who was the first head of the Kaijo Hoancho (Maritime Safety Agency). (Later Okubo became a member of the Ohira faction of the LDP and I think was Labor Minister under Prime Minister Ohira). Burke asked Okubo how many minesweepers he had in the MSA. Okubo said one hundred and some, and Burke said he wanted 95 at Shimonoseki. Okubo said he couldn’t do that without the order of Prime Minister Yoshida, and Burke said, okay, let’s go see PM Yoshida. PM Yoshida said he couldn’t dispatch the ships without the order of General MacArthur. And Admiral Burke said that is why he was present, that he was giving the PM the order of General MacArthur. I got these facts declassified. I think the Japanese Foreign Ministry had been sort of worried that the minesweeping operations were a skeleton in the closet, but presented in the context of a dissertation which made it clear that Japan was under occupation there was little problem.

When I presented these facts to Reischauer’s seminar, he was really surprised. He said he didn’t know that. And he said if he didn’t know it, he didn’t think any other American knew it. He didn’t think many Japanese knew it either. Someday, he said a Japanese would write a definitive history of this period. But since defense was still a taboo subject in Japan (in 1970) and since the U.S. Navy had given me an extra year of graduate school because the Navy greatly reduced its number of ships suddenly, Reischaeur suggested I go to Japan and interview as many people as possible before they died. I said that I couldn’t speak Japanese. And Reischauer said in a year there is nothing I could do, so don’t try to learn Japanese. He suggested just to go and interview those who I could interview in English and then get a competent interpreter (and he gave some suggestions of friends of his) for the others. So my dissertation consisted of 200 interviews. Defense Minister Nakasone was one of the interviewees. But one of the people I came to know (through the coincidence that his government secretary was a Navy buff) was Funada Naka, who was the Speaker of the House of Representatives and of course Funada had been Defense Minister himself and was very committed to the U.S.-Japan relationship.

When I got into my new job as Political Adviser to the Navy in Yokosuka, I went to pay my greetings to Mr. Funada, who by this time knew me very well. He questioned me quite extensively. He said this was a wonderful job for me and I should be very happy. I said yes but I thought there were some very difficult issues. And he asked which I thought were difficult. He said defense is very important for Japan and thus I shouldn’t have any difficulties with Japan. I said there was a U.S. idea to base a carrier at Yokosuka. But the State Department’s opinion is that the government of Japan won’t think positively about doing so. Why? he asked. I said I think State feels that the U.S. announced it was going to leave Japan and the Soviet threat in Asia is not well appreciated in Japan. He responded that the Soviet threat was becoming important for Japan too. And the Soviets were expanding into the Pacific. So about once a month, I would bring my boss, Rear Admiral Julian T. Burke, to Tokyo in civilian clothes and we would go to Speaker’s (of the Diet) Official Residence and Mr. Funada would ask Admiral Burke questions about the U.S.-Japan relationship, how carriers operate, etc. Frankly, we didn’t know why Mr. Funada was doing this. I would say over a four month period of time I took him there somewhere between five or six times. Finally one night at a cocktail party at the Official Residence, Mr. Funada came up to Ambassador Ingersoll and Dick Sneider and said he understood that the U.S. might be interested in basing an aircraft carrier at Yokosuka. Of course, he said the U.S. has the right to do that under the Security Treaty, but the U.S. might want to ask Japan’s opinion. He added that then Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was a very capable man in many ways, but he had never really studied strategic military matters. Over the past few months, therefore, Mr. Funada said he had been educating the PM about these issues and he now understood that basing a U.S. carrier in Japan would enhance the U.S.-Japan security treaty to the benefit of Japan. Mr. Funada said he hoped it would be of benefit to the United States as well. He said if the U.S. wanted Japan’s opinion as to whether the U.S. should base a carrier in Japan or not, or want Japan’s agreement, the PM authorized him to say Japan would support the U.S. plan. And at that time the American Embassy reported to Washington that the Japanese government would go along. I personally believe that without the U.S.S. MIDWAY, which was based in Japan from 1973 until it was replaced in the early 1990s by the U.S.S. INDEPENDENCE, the credibility of the U.S. commitment to all of the Far East and to the defense of Japan would not have nearly been as strong as it was. I am proud that I was able to play a small role as go-between for the basing of the U.S.S. MIDWAY in Japan.
MURATA: Tanaka became Prime Minister in 1972, so…

AUER: Yes, it was during that time. I finished my dissertation in July of 1971. I became Political Adviser in Yokosuka in October of 1971. The U.S.S. MIDWAY arrived at Yokosuka in 1973, so it was sometime in 1972 that that meeting between Ambassador Ingersoll and Mr. Funada took place.
MURATA: What you did was to introduce your boss to Mr. Funada?
AUER: Correct.
MURATA: And you accompanied him?
AUER: Yes, I used to take him to Tokyo about once a month. The Navy never had a Political Adviser before at Yokosuka. Bill Sherman was the Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy. I called him up and said I was a Navy lieutenant commander and I had just been assigned to be the Navy’s Political Adviser. I said I didn’t know what a political adviser was supposed to do. He said that as Political Counselor he convened a Political Section meeting every week. He invited me to come once or twice, and, if I found the meetings valuable or worthwhile, he said I was welcome to come any time. So for two years I went to the Political Section meeting at the Embassy every week. That is how I met Mike Armacost because he also attended the Political Section meetings.

MURATA: In addition to Funada, did you meet with any other politicians? Did you meet with Tanaka himself?
AUER: No. I met with Mr. Ohira when he was Foreign Minister through the introduction of Mr. Okubo, whom I had interviewed as part of my dissertation research. I interviewed a number of Japanese politicians. But I never negotiated with Mr. Funada. And I don’t think it would be correct to say that Admiral Burke negotiated with Mr. Funada. Adm. Burke would essentially come up to Tokyo and let Mr. Funada ask him questions. At the same time, negotiations were going on between the U.S. Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially the Ampoka (Security Division) about the homeporting issue, but it had not been raised to the highest level of the Japanese government (at some point the Foreign Ministry must have done that). Again it was the State Department’s opinion, at least initially, and perhaps until Mr. Funada passed on Prime Minister Tanaka’s positive stance on the issue, that in fact the Japanese Government would find homeporting difficult. When Mr. Funada told the Ambassador that the Prime Minister authorized him to say Japan would support homeporting, I think it accelerated the progress.
MURATA: We were told by someone in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that after the Nixon Shock, there was a mood in the Ministry to try to change the Security Treaty to a more moderate one or at least modify the Security Treaty so that the U.S. presence would become less visible. Did you sense that mood?

AUER: As I mentioned, just a few months before the decision to homeport an aircraft carrier in Japan, a decision had been made and announced to in fact virtually withdraw the U.S. Navy from Japan. So maybe, the fact that the U.S. had announced a significant drawdown, fostered a feeling in the Ministry that the treaty should be “moderated.” I should say I did some things that I was not ordered to do by Admiral Burke because we weren’t directed to negotiate with the Japanese Government. Admiral Burke was a senior official and he could have been fired if he overstepped. I could have been fired too, of course, but I was still single and I knew homeporting was a U.S. National Security Council position. I did have private talks not initiated by me, with people in the Ampoka whom I had interviewed when I was researching my dissertation. They occasionally invited me for lunch. I found that their feelings about the American idea for homeporting was in fact more positive than the American Embassy’s. They might have been the faction in the Foreign Ministry that felt the Security Treaty should be enhanced. (There may well have been another faction that did not feel that way.) I informed the Embassy about my meetings. Tom Shoesmith had become DCM and he invited me to lunch and asked whom I was meeting with (maybe someone was tailing me — I say this as a joke). I said I had met with people in the Ampoka who seem to think homeporting is a good idea. I didn’t say that Admiral Burke was coming up and meeting with Mr. Funada. Also, the Admiral never told me to go meet Mr. Funada. I brought Admiral Burke when Mr. Funada invited him to come. Mr. Funada invited Admiral Burke to the opening ceremony of the Diet, which was very impressive and interesting to Americans, to see the Showa Emperor in the morning at a very formal ceremony and then to see Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in the afternoon pounding his fist while delivering his policy speech. Mr. Funada invited a number of visiting U.S. admirals to that ceremony. And then Mr. Funada started inviting Admiral Burke more frequently and kept asking questions about homeporting the U.S.S. MIDWAY in Yokosuka.

MURATA: This is interesting because this was after the Nixon Shock and the opening with China which means the military threat…

AUER: But the military problem was not directed at China. The U.S. was concerned from 1945 or at least from 1950 with the Soviet Union. In 1949, with the Chinese Communists winning the revolution, there was a fear of world wide Communism, but in fact, even at the worst of times, the U.S. Navy was supreme in the Pacific. So the worry was the Soviet Union and that was primarily a European worry; and the fact that the Japanese side was not terribly worried was not surprising to the U.S. But the Soviet Union had a corrupt political system (as we know now) and a corrupt economic system and therefore they could only be a superpower by building raw military power. And they finally accumulated so much military hardware, that in addition to positioning so much of it in Europe, they started to buildup the Far East as well. The Nixon Doctrine began with pulling out of Vietnam (and the Japanese thought we should never be in Vietnam in the first place — and they were right — and they didn’t think China was a great threat). In the 1960s, the only Asian threat apparent was China, which was not very real to the Americans or to the Japanese; but in 1970, with the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine and the pull-out from Vietnam, and with the Soviet Union now expanding, for the first time, the Japanese Government began to wonder how low the U.S. was going to go. Japan didn’t want the U.S. to pull everything out of the Far East. That is when, I think, Defense Minister Michita Sakata and others started asking for enhanced cooperation. So I think the Japanese became more sensitive to the fact that there was a threat, not from China but from the Soviet Union and if the U.S. pulled out of the Far East completely, the Japanese would have to face that threat alone. And I think that was a very realistic perception on the Japanese part.